The Two Battles of the Marne by unknow

Author:unknow
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, World War I, Europe, Great Britain, General, Germany, France
ISBN: 9781787206960
Google: GfkwDwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
Published: 2017-07-11T15:56:50+00:00

In view of these contradictions, it seems probable that each of those present at the conference put an individual interpretation on instructions which were none too clearly defined and which were not reduced to writing.

Hentsch’s conviction that at least a retreat of the right wing could not be avoided was in full accord with Moltke’s pessimism He started on his mission imbued with the preconceived idea of the necessity for a retreat. It was impossible for him to adapt himself to the situation as he found it at First and Second Army headquarters-a situation radically different from the conception which he had arrived at through mathematical deduction while far removed from the actual field of battle.

The conversation between Hentsch and General von Bülow on the evening of September 8 at Castle Montmort should have made it plain to Hentsch that his conception of the situation was not borne out by reality. General von Bülow seriously remonstrated when Hentsch suggested “a voluntary and timely retreat.” The leader of the Second Army pointed out that his troops were not at all in an unfavorable situation. General von Bülow and Hentsch, however, did agree that the situation of General von Kluck’s First Army was untenable, as its flank and rear were jeopardized from the direction of the Marne. They also agreed that the First Army should immediately retreat.

General von Bülow thought it possible for Von Kluck’s First Army to regain contact with and the support of Von Bülow’s army forces by merely moving back to a line running from La Ferté-Milon to Château-Thierry. Hentsch could not be convinced that this was possible.

He was certain that the reestablishment of connections between the two armies could only be achieved by a retreat of the inner wings of both armies in the direction of Fismes.

A compromise was finally reached. General von Bülow agreed to order the retreat of his Second Army if the enemy actually crossed the Marne with strong forces, thus threatening the rear of General son Kluck’s First Army. This agreement was a victory for Hentsch. As long as no information came from the First Army to indicate that it was unable by its own sole power to cope with threats at its flank and rear, there was no reason, except Hentsch’s pessimism, for the retreat of the Second Army.

The fact that General von Bülow agreed to order his Second Army to draw back without making any attempt to inform himself of the actual conditions of the First Army, and without waiting for a clarification of the whole situation, constitutes, to my mind, his part of the guilt in the fateful retreat.

An extenuating circumstance, however, is the fact that General von Bülow did not know that it was the intention of General von Kluck to bring about a decision of the battle by an attack on his extreme right. In the stress of events, communications between the First and Second armies did not function properly. This was regrettable but understandable.

This same extenuating circumstance does not apply to Hentsch.

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